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Abstract  
Purpose: The purpose of the paper is to explore the entry modes of EU firms setting up operations in Vietnam. 
Design/methodology/approach: We use a case study approach on Haymarket, Cadbury, Creative Education, Fairchild, Aventis 
and Artemisinin and Farming International using interviews from managerial professionals in Vietnam. 
Findings: Despite the fact that Vietnam has been opening up for more than 20 years, licensing is the preferred entry mode because 
of the risks involved in venturing with local firms; that preference signals a low level commitment and a high perception of risk and 
state interference. In line with Vietnam transition to state - rather than private market - capitalism, a foreign company opting for a 
joint-venture will do so with a state-owned rather than privately-owned company. The choice of a subsidiary can be explained by 
the lack of trust in partners and institutions, not by improvement in the socio-political environment. 
Limitations: In determining the entry mode strategy, the paper focuses on the Uppsala school’s “psychic distance” (e.g. cultural 
distance, lack of trust) rather than on firm-specific advantages (Rugman, 1980; 2006). 
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Daniel Simonet                                                 
I. Foreign	  firms	  and	  the	  preference	  for	  private	  partners	  in	  newly-­‐emerging	  emerging	  markets	  
Reducing dependency remains a priority 
for foreign firms entering a newly-emerging, often 
adversarial market. That dependency ranges from 
access to markets, control over distribution 
channels, acquisition of business licenses, human 
capital, and government connections, the latter 
playing a prominent role in emerging markets. 
Government role can be positive, as documented in 
Russia where local governments use reforms to 
attract investments (Meyer and Pind, 1999), in 
China with the creation of special economic zones, 
and in India where states use tax incentives to 
attract foreign investment (Oman, 2000). It can also 
be restrictive: the government may impose a 
mandatory partnership with a local firm (e.g. 
Malaysia, Indonesia), or the purchase of locally-
made components. Thus, firm operating within 
restrictive state-controlled environment will attempt 
to diminish government interference, thus might opt 
for a private rather than public partnership when 
possible. This is likely to be the preferred option if 
they have little experience managing government 
relations or, if they target a private - rather than 
public - market. Besides, dealing with private actors 
usually involves a variety of participants with 
different levels of power which the foreign firm can 
played against one another to extract better 
contracting terms: in the Vietnamese industrial 
equipment industry for instance, exclusive 
distribution agreements are limited to a period of 2 
to 3 years (Tuang and Stringer, 2008), which 
enables foreign suppliers to shift to an alternative 
distributor should the need arise. 
 
The number of stakeholder is also a factor. 
Contrary to democracies, where dealing with the 
public sector involves many stakeholders (e.g. 
interest groups, political parties, the mass media, 
citizen and consumer association), doing business in 
government-restricted markets involves fewer, often 
government-controlled, stakeholders. These can be 
more powerful, and thus put the foreign firm in a 
more dependent position. To eliminate that 
dependence, a foreign entrant may prefer a private - 
rather than public - partner. Accountability and 
transparency are two other factors that make 
partnership with a private firm a more attractive 
option: while in free market and democratic 
countries, dealing with public organizations means 
a public display of accountability and frequent 
changes in officials; in contrast, the public service is 
less open to outside pressure and removal of 
ineffective public servants. By partnering with a 
private - rather than a public - company, a foreign 
firm can reduce those risks drastically (Dye, 2010).   
 
Sound management of financial reserves is 
another reason to prefer a partner from the private 
sector. While public actors (e.g. elected officials) 
spend someone else’s money, private individuals 
and business owners usually spend their own 
money, and will be more conscious when making 
investment decisions. Thus, partnership with private 
firms shall limit the risk of resource squandering, as 
accountability is greater with private business 
owners. Other factors such as monopoly (statutory 
or de facto), tendencies to over-spend and over-
regulate, failures in core roles (e.g. infrastructure), 
the pursuit of self-interest amongst both politicians 
and civil servants which leads to resource 
misallocation, decisions based on political rather 
than public benefits, all of which being more 
prevalent in adversarial - rather than mature - 
markets, would in principle deter investors from 
partnering with public firms, thus makes partnership 
with a private firm a preferred option (Clemons et 
al., 2009; Post et al., 2002). 
 
Reputation is a factor in emerging 
government-controlled economies. Fearing a 
boycott at home, foreign investors are wary of being 
associated with countries that are at odds with the 
international community, as this would affect their 
reputation at home. That happened to the French oil 
firm Total in Burma. That risk has become greater 
because information circulates more rapidly. Media 
pressure and reiterated calls for boycott by not-for-
profit organizations can harm the reputation of a 
firm in its domestic market for actions conducted 
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overseas. In contrast, supporting a private business 
is less likely to generate a similar backlash.  
 
Another factor concerned planning 
horizon. Public budgets must be planned well in 
advance of the spending year. Private sector budgets 
are short-term, more flexible and can be adjusted: 
they can be remade just about any time management 
decides. That flexibility is another reason to prefer a 
private - rather than public - partnership.  
  
P1 Firms entering a newly-emerging 
government-controlled market will prefer a 
partnership with a private - rather than public - 
organization 
 
However, a partnership with a 
government-linked company remains relevant in 
some occasions e.g. when the foreign firm target 
public buyers; when the private sector is still in 
infancy; or when the foreign entrant is public (i.e. a 
preference may be given to a partner with a similar 
culture)  
II. Time-­‐horizon	  and	  the	  preference	  for	  high-­‐equity	  entry	  modes	  
 
There is another factor to consider: time 
horizon. In developing countries, there has been a 
shift in development strategies recommended by 
international money lenders (e.g. ADB) with a 
preference for long term projects and nation 
building. In these countries, capacity building has 
become the new mantra. Aid has shifted from 
economic infrastructure and services to increased 
emphasis on basic social services and public 
management capabilities (World Bank, OECD). 
Dominica and Rwanda exemplify the features of old 
and new style aid. Dominica, still receives about 
80% of aid in form of economic infrastructure 
projects, such as roads, water supply, or irrigation. 
The aid programs of Rwanda have changed 
dramatically, with education, health and other social 
programs taking the lion’s share (World Bank, 
OECD). In other countries, debt relief has become a 
major part of aid, relieving financial pressures of 
past, poorly-conceived or managed development 
programs. For foreign firms, as the time horizon of 
public development projects increases (which is 
also an indication of international lenders’ 
commitment), risk intensity is not inherently less, 
but rather spreads over a longer period, thereby 
signaling that a short term loss could be offset on 
the long run. A foreign investor is more likely to 
adopt a high equity entry mode if it feels that the 
project duration is enough to recoup its investment, 
or if the benefits of the entry mode will fully 
materialize within a timeframe backed by an 
international institution. Hence, the longer the time 
horizon and project life cycle, the greater the 
commitment in the form of a more structured entry 
mode e.g. subsidiary. As international community 
support, investment visibility grow, and the host 
country gains socio-political stability (Urata and al, 
2006), the perception of risk diminishes, and 
foreign firms are more inclined to increase their 
commitment in the form of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary e.g. foreign subsidiaries in China can be 
found in areas that offer the best long term 
prospects, as in the Pearl River Delta where 
major Japanese firms have established 
subsidiaries to serve the Guangdong i, 
Guangxi, Fujian and Hainan provinces.  
 
P2 As the socio-political environment 
stabilizes, foreign firms will prefer a wholly-owned 
subsidiary over a low-equity entry mode (e.g. 
alliance, joint venture, partnership) 
 
P3 As the time horizon of foreign 
investment expands, foreign firms prefer a wholly-
owned subsidiary over a low-equity entry mode 
(e.g. alliance, joint venture, partnership) 
 
However, the time-horizon approach with 
its emphasis on long term projects underestimates 
rapid country changes: the Middle East, Turkey and 
North Africa region have emerged as promising off 
shore destinations because of their large, well-
educated population and proximity to Europe in the 
late 2000s (AT Kearney). In particular, Cairo 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
i In 2008, the Guangdong province alone contributed to 
almost 12 percent of China’s national GDP, the 
largest of all provinces and municipalities, and to 
nearly 30 % of China’s total exports 
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(Egypt) in North Africa has undertaken major 
infrastructure projects and administrative reforms to 
minimize risks to foreign investors. Rankings have 
changed in recent years: Dubai debt problem 
prompted foreign firms to consider alternative 
business hubs (e.g. Qatar, Bahrain) in the Middle 
East region, but these eventually stayed in Dubai as 
it provided political stability in the context of the 
Arab spring. In Southeast Asia, Thailand is no 
longer perceived as a safe investment destination 
due to its recent political turmoil and rioting.   
 
Foreign firms’ expectations and criteria to 
select a destination also vary over time. Years ago, 
the importance of host economy size and wealth, 
and more recently MNC agglomeration were major 
criteria when selecting a host country. Cheaper but 
skilled labor pools and tax incentives were also 
taken into consideration. But these criteria did not 
reflect certain risks (e.g. personal safety). South 
Africa, Nigeria, Pakistan, Kenya and Jamaica later 
proved unreliable, and criteria for selecting a 
country were amended. Current rankings of safest 
and riskiest places are now based on a wider range 
of factors which includes high terrorist or rebel 
threats, uncontrolled environmental pollution, 
corruption and organized crime, currency 
instability, geopolitical conditions cultural 
dissimilarities and unsecured communication 
networks: while India continues to be the most 
favored back-office of the world (Brown and 
Wilson 2009), it holds a precarious ranking in 
certain areas: unlike China, India’s democratic 
society, and strong secondary stakeholders (e.g. free 
press and an active civil society which include 
NGOs, labor unions and politicians) will not 
hesitate to challenge foreign companies in courts, in 
the media, or via on site demonstration, especially 
when it involves land acquisition or other aspects of 
their livelihood (Vachani, 2008); Wal-Mart had to 
delay its entry in the Indian market because activists 
were concerned that the firm will hurt the livelihood 
of small traders. In addition, there are sector-
specific and country-specific criteria e.g. in the off 
shoring industry, similar time zone and language 
skills are critical factors due to the necessity to 
communicate with clients based in the West (e.g. 
British operators with Indian and Philippine call-
centers; French operators with Tunisian and 
Moroccan call-centers). While the severity and 
complexity of country vulnerabilities has 
skyrocketed, firms often consider a - too - narrow 
set of criteria (e.g. typically country risk, 
competitiveness, costs) when selecting a foreign 
market. 
III. Investment	  delays	  and	  the	  preference	  for	  wholly-­‐owned	  subsidiaries.	  
 
Entry barriers can be a deterrent to joint-
ventures: partners and service providers, 
particularly in the financial services, insurance and 
telecom sectors often demand hefty upfront 
payments. To this, add another constraint: time. 
Finding a suitable partner is difficult and time-
consuming in newly-emerging markets: after 
announcing its intention to enter the Indian market 
in 2002, Starbucks signed an agreement with Tata 
in 2004 to source premium coffee beans. However, 
in 2009, the company was still looking for a partner 
(it was rumored to be in talks with Jubilant Group, 
the Indian franchisee for Domino’s pizzaii), and its 
entry in the Indian coffee market was delayed again. 
There are also country- rather than company-
specific - causes of delays such as a lack of 
confidence, uncertainty regarding economic 
performance and growth, as evidenced in Malaysia 
(Duasa, 2007) or in the pharmaceutical industry of 
Vietnam: while as many as 266 foreign businesses 
had registered to operate in Vietnam in 2005iii, only 
42% of combined investment capital of US$ 240 
million had been disbursed, and authorities had 
licensed just 35 foreign-invested projectsiv. For 
foreign firms, waiting is no longer an option: while 
years ago, adverse market conditions would prompt 
a foreign entrant to delay market entry, this is not 
possible because globalization makes the world 
faster: in a fast-paced environment, firms will be 
pressed to accelerate - rather than delay - their entry 
plan, even under adverse market conditions. To 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
ii  http://us.asiancorrespondent.com/indianomics/starbucks-in-
india-%E2%80%93-right-time-or-about-time 
iii Source : Ministry of Health 
ivVNECONOMY. Foreign pharmaceutical companies show 
interest in Vietnam. 26/09/2005.Source: Vietnam Agency. 
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control local operations and avoid delays caused by 
ineffective partners, and to eliminate the risk 
associated with a joint-venture, and increase speed 
of entry, foreign firms will opt for an acquisition or 
the creation of a fully-owned subsidiary.  
 
P4: Investment delay leads foreign 
investors to prefer a wholly-owned subsidiary over 
a joint venture in a newly-emerging market 
IV. Effectiveness,	  opportunism	  and	  the	  preference	  for	  subsidiaries	  
 
According to the Uppsala model (Johanson 
and Weidersheim-Paul, 1975), a high level of 
cultural distance between the country of origin and 
the target country is a deterrent to entry modes that 
involve high levels of ownership and control (Hill, 
Hwang and Kim, 1990). Cultural distance makes 
capabilities transfers more difficult: managers are 
reluctant to deepen involvement in markets they 
know little about, restrain their commitment (e.g. 
financial stake) when differences in values and 
beliefs between their home country and the host 
country are large, thus will prefer a joint-venture 
over a subsidiary in less culturally familiar 
environments (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Gatignon 
and Anderson, 1988). There is an incremental 
expansion strategy encompassed in this school of 
thought: it implies a form of low commitment 
during initial entry (e.g. a licensing agreements has 
traditionally been a way to test a new market while 
keeping sunk costs lowv), especially in market with 
greater “psychic distance” (e.g. differences in 
language education, business practices, culture and 
industrial development), and a greater commitment 
(e.g. subsidiary), as familiarity with the market 
develops (Sim, Rajendram Pandian, 2007).  
 
While other scholars (Jung, 2004; Tatoglu, 
et al., 2003) too argue that “firms are more likely to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
v  as withdrawal is a possible occurrence in transition 
economies with changing regulatory frameworks 
have difficulties in managing foreign operations 
alone”, Hymer (1960) and Shenkar (2001) assert 
that full ownership and the resulting total control 
allow managers to conduct business in their own 
way, which is thought to be more effective and 
straightforward than relying on local agents whose 
behavior is little known or cannot be predicted. 
Performance drivers such as local responsiveness or 
information flow are less effective in adversarial 
environment (Oliver, 1991): a local partner may be 
passive/dormant, act as a buffer between the foreign 
firm and the target market, thereby distorting 
critical information; maintain a hidden agenda (e.g. 
acquisition of foreign know-how before setting up a 
competing business), has harmful motives (e.g. a 
licensee may not develop the product of the licensor 
because of the NIH syndrome), or may acquire a 
license to prevent a foreign competitor from 
introducing a competing product (i.e. market 
preemption strategy), thus gain time to develop its 
own line of products (Simonet, 2002). Dues to these 
shortcomings, alliances were often ineffective: 
joint-ventures and other temporary transitional 
organizational form (Porter, 1990; Williamson, 
1991) were either terminated or suffered from 
changes in the ownership structure (Yan & Zeng, 
1999) due to opportunism (Parkhe, 1993), and the 
unequal pace of learning (Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998) with most exits by 
international joint ventures consisting in a sale to 
one of the partner firms or ‘‘internalization’’ 
(Hennart et al., 1998). 
 
When newly-emerging markets open up to 
foreign investors, early entrants face a lack of 
potential partners, either because of the local firm’s 
inexperience, or because of different strategic 
priorities at the country-level: for example, in 
contrast to other East Asian countries (e.g. Korea) 
that focus on competitive advantage in light 
industries (Lee, 2005), Vietnam has focused on its 
competitive advantages in agricultural (e.g. rice and 
coffee) and aquatic products, which create a dearth 
of potential partners in the industry and in the 
service sector. Though suitable partners may also be 
lacking because of potentially opportunistic 
behaviors, opportunism can be reduced in different 
ways e.g. repeated transactions with a small set of 
contractors; economies of scale and scope in 
transacting (e.g. a high volume of exchange 
between transactors); extensive inter-firm 
information sharing (e.g. to reduce information 
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asymmetry); the use of non-contractual, self-
enforcing safeguards (i.e., goodwill) which are 
effective for an indefinite time horizon (as opposed 
to contracts which are effective for a finite time 
horizon); key personal contacts with critical social 
capital and other factors (e.g. partner’s customer 
orientation) (Truang and Stringer, 2008); and 
investments in co-specialized assets (e.g. a Free 
Trade Zone with the local partner providing 
manpower, assets and land). However, these 
mechanisms are difficult to find in unchartered 
markets e.g. transactions may be irregular due to 
economic and political disruption; newly-
established privately-owned firms neither have a 
reputation of being trustworthy, nor a history of 
partnering (Nguyen, 2005) ; non-contractual 
safeguards are weaker in adversarial environments: 
the local partner may not have specialized assets to 
share (e.g. if the foreign firm is looking for non-
specific assets e.g. low-cost labor). Besides sharing 
specific assets is only a short-term temporary fix: it 
would still require a contract regarding availability 
and lease of equipment, which will generate 
transaction costs. Faced with a possible hostage-like 
situation (when sunk costs are high) or a lack of 
alternatives (e.g. when there are no substitute 
partners), foreign firms will opt for internalization 
(i.e. a subsidiary). 
 
P5: In adversarial markets, effectiveness 
(i.e. ability to achieve a desired goal) and 
opportunistic partners leads foreign investors to 
prefer a subsidiary over a partnership  
 
Contracts often serve an implicit function, 
acting as 'self-enforcing' agreements, and are often 
viewed as symbol of 'trust' (Telser, 1980; Sako, 
1991), or goodwill (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; 
Sako, 1991). Trust can be defined as being “the 
firm’s belief that another company will perform 
actions that will result in positive outcomes for the 
firm, as well as not take unexpected actions that 
would result in negative outcomes for the firm” 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990, p.45 in Tuang and 
Stringer, 2008). Trust is an essential element in 
reducing relationship and transaction costs (Dyer 
and Chu, 2003), particularly in emerging markets 
marked by weak safeguards and governance 
structures. When countries compete for foreign 
investment, the one with the lowest costs in 
relationship building will be selected Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (1975). Should these costs increase 
further, internalization (e.g. an acquisition, a start-
up, a subsidiary) will be preferred over a local 
partnership. 
 
Trust and other factors (i.e. reputation) are 
effective safeguards when doing business. Private 
firms must devote time to develop new relationships 
and trust with partners (Nguyen TV et al, 2005). 
However, building trust is more difficult when 
significant income disparities exists (Wilkinson, 
Pickett, 2009), in countries at odds with the 
international community, or in transitional 
economies (Nguyen et al, 2005): in Vietnam, 
property rights are not well defined and private 
sector legitimacy is weak; market institutions and 
infrastructure are largely underdeveloped. A 
compounding factor, foreign governments might 
attempt to build legitimacy by blaming foreign 
governments for their own inadequacies, thereby 
generating more distrust between local and foreign 
organization.  
 
Often, the level of trust depends on 
perceived fairness within the transaction. A lack of 
perceived fairness will result in higher transaction 
costs right from the start i.e. the response to 
injustice is “neglect” or a deterioration of conditions 
which lead to greater opportunistic behaviors 
(Husted, Folger, 2004). Fairness - or the lack of it - 
leads to higher transaction costs, thus make it more 
difficult for MNC to achieve their objective when 
expanding overseas. In line with the transaction 
costs theory that suggests that firms minimize their 
costs as they grow, a subsidiary would eliminate 
monitoring costs in transaction whenever neglect is 
possible. When trust is lacking and when the 
transaction suffers from perceived unfairness, high-
equity modes should be preferred over low-equity 
entry modes. This also justifies takeovers: 
converting a joint venture into a wholly-owned 
subsidiary is more likely when there is a need to 
prevent neglect, for instance when conflict arises 
(Steensma et al, 2007). 
 
Conversely, a greater level of trust and 
goodwill will prompt foreign firm to opt for a 
subsidiary: in the 1990s, a rapid familiarity with the 
emerging markets of Eastern and Central Europe 
(Estrin et al., 1997; Meyer, 1998) coupled with the 
European Economic Community’s willingness to 
integrate these countries in the EEC to build 
political stability and peace following the collapse 
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of the Soviet Union justified the preference for 
high-equity entry modes. In line with the Uppsala 
model, foreigners increase their commitment (e.g. 
subsidiary) in markets with limited “psychic 
distance”, rising familiarity and trust (Sim, J. 
Rajendram Pandian, 2007): 
 
P6. A wholly-owned subsidiary will be 
preferred in two opposite situations: either when the 
target market is unfamiliar and trust lacking, or 
when the target market is familiar and trust 
abundant. 
 
V. Company	  size	  and	  Experience	  	  
 
Bargaining power affects firms differently, 
and depends on both company size and experience. 
Bargaining power exists between MNCs that have a 
preference for high-control entry modes, especially 
if the project is long-term; the government of the 
hosting country, which hopes to create jobs and 
earn tax; and the local firms that need foreign 
support to expand. Foreign firms have bargaining 
power because the newly-emerging markets of 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos vie with each other 
for foreign investments: “Despite being neighbors 
with close fraternal ties, no Indochina country 
ranks amongst the largest investors in another 
country of the sub-(Indochina) region,… three 
countries are competing with each other to attract 
FDI inflows” (Freeman, 2002b). Cambodia offers 
some unique advantages: “Foreign investors are 
allowed to own a company outright, without a local 
partner. There are no restrictions on funds 
transfers, no exchange controls and Cambodia is 
one of the few least-developed countries to have 
joined the World Trade organizationvi”. Regarding 
size, Chen and Chen (1998) assert that large firms 
are better able to establish a position in primitive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
vi Interview of Bretton G. Sciaroni. Sciaroni & Associates. 
Phonm Penh. In Cambodia Is Hard Sell for Investment 
Companies. June 29, 2010 By Simon Marks. The New York 
Times 
and non-institutionalized networks: “…members of 
the community often consist of multinational 
enterprises that individually generate global annual 
revenues that far exceed the annual GDP of some 
host countries, and have the trans-continental 
balance sheets to match…” (Freeman, 2002b). In a 
survey of tenant firms of a Vietnamese industrial 
park, the smaller companies view government 
regulations as the major constraint they encountered 
(in contrast, the larger companies cited competition 
for overseas competitors) (Yeoh et al, 2004). Parent 
firm size, possession of some knowledge-based and 
firm-specific strategic assets also prompt a firm to 
opt for entry modes with a higher degree of control 
(Tan et al., 2001): the larger the firm, the higher the 
propensity to adopt a high equity mode that allows 
full control (Leung et al., 2003).  
 
For cultural differences and host country 
conditions reduce foreign firms’ ability to extract 
valuable location-specific resources (Birkinshaw 
and Hood’s 1998), the foreign entrant’ experience is 
a factor in absorbing knowledge from its overseas 
acquisitions: a more experienced entrant will find it 
easier to manage cultural differences, or is more 
able to make a correct evaluation of a potential 
acquisition (i.e. cherry-picking). Thus, experienced 
- rather than inexperienced - foreign firms are more 
likely to opt for a wholly-owned subsidiary. 	  	  
 
P7: A large and experienced entrant will 
prefer a wholly-owned subsidiary (i.e. 
internalization) over a low-equity entry mode when 
entering an newly-emerging market 	  
However, this relationship does not appear 
uniform in Asia. In South-Asia in particular, large 
and experienced firms do not systematically opt for 
acquisitions: while Starbucks is a large and 
experienced entrant (years ago, it was a successful 
first entrant in the Japanese and Chinese markets), 
there is no indication of its intention to open a 
subsidiary in India. As for Gap, while its stores in 
other - more mature - retail markets such as Canada, 
France, Ireland, Japan, UK, and US (and Puerto 
Rico) are company-owned, stores outside of these 
countries are owned and operated by franchisees. 
Other large single-brand firm with significant 
international experience such as apparel retailers 
(e.g. Diesel, Tommy Hilfiger, Esprit, Louis Vuitton, 
FCUK, Lee Cooper, Escada, Guess, Dunhill, and 
Mango), mass-retailers (e.g. Marks & Spencer, 
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Debenhams, Next) and fast-food company (e.g. 
Pizza Hut) also entered the Indian market though 
the franchise routevii. In contrast to India, will the 
large and experienced entrants of our case group 
adopt a wholly-owned subsidiary (i.e. 
internalization) when entering Vietnam? 
VI. Asset	  specificity	  and	  capability	  Matching	  
 
While cultural distance is a factor in 
choosing an entry mode, asset specificity is critical: 
according to Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975), 
if asset specificity and risk intensity are high, and 
transactions frequent, the firm will prefer 
internalization, and high-equity entry modes such as 
wholly-owned subsidiaries will prevail. Asset 
specificity in emerging economies has often been 
analyzed in terms of risks e.g. a local partner may 
copy an innovation or product (i.e. a tangible 
specific asset), dilute a brand (i.e. an intangible 
specific asset), or deteriorate the quality of a 
product. However, asset specificity should be 
viewed in terms of capacity matching: to make the 
partnership worthwhile, the local firm must have the 
capacity to absorb the capabilities of its foreign 
partner. In a newly-emerging market with greater 
psychic distance, the more specific the asset, the 
more difficult the absorption: a local firm in Laos, 
Vietnam or Cambodia may not have the 
technological know-how to maximum the use of the 
product of its foreign parent company, or the 
marketing skills needed to promote a foreign brand 
adequately. Imitation is less likely to occur when a 
foreign firm is unable to comprehend the value of 
an innovation it gets hold of, or unable to turn it to 
its advantage: simple imitation ignores what made 
the original great, as exemplified in the cargo-cult 
metaphorviii . Capacity matching is a more critical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
vii www.cci.in/pdf/surveys_reports/indias_retail_sector.pdf 
viii  During World War II, islands in the Pacific are were key 
locations for the belligerent and received large quantities of 
air-dropped supplies (e.g. food, weapons, medicine) destined 
to both  Japanese and US troops. Some of these supplies 
were shared with the indigenous people who lived on the 
 
 
factor than cultural distance when choosing a 
subsidiary.  
 
P8 Capacity matching concerns - rather 
than cultural distance - will prompt a foreign firm to 
opt for a high equity entry mode in a newly-
emerging market 
 
Foreign firms often source for cheaper 
resources, moving their business to locations that 
are the most affordable: in response to increasing 
costs in the most advanced Asian countries (e.g. 
Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia), MNCs have shifted 
their operations to China. Still, the rapid increase in 
wages has eroded China’s attractiveness as a low-
wage investment base and enticed Chinese firms to 
relocate labor-intensive manufacturing (e.g. 
clothing and footwear) lo lower wage neighboring 
countries. Chinese investors are already the largest 
investors in the Cambodian garment industry 
(Athukorala, 2008). Japanese firms have started 
shifting factories from China to Vietnam in 
response to strikes for higher wagesix. The degree of 
asset specificity foreign firm seek overseas will 
determine the entry mode in a host country: 
investors looking for non-specific resources (i.e. 
readily available and easily reproducible such as 
low-labor cost) will opt for a low-equity entry mode 
because it makes divestiture easier: they will then 
be more able to move their assets to a new location, 
if it offers lower labor costs. A low equity entry 
mode will be preferred when (i) asset specificity is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
islands. When the war ended, they imitated what they saw ,  
building large-scale replica of air-strips, bamboo control 
towers and straw planes, which was not good enough to 
bring the supplies back. They did not understand the 
underlying logic of the air-drop. 
 
ix According to the Japanese External Trade Agency, Japanese 
direct investment in Vietnam that stood at 140 million 
dollars in 2009 have reached 1.1 billion over the first 5 
months of 2010. 
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low (e.g. unskilled labor is widely available); (ii)  
there is a high need for re-deployability (e.g. should 
labor costs increase further). In contrast, investors 
in search of specific assets (i.e. rarer, more 
expensive, or demanding a higher mobilization of 
resources) will either set up a subsidiary, or acquire 
a firm in the host country. As a result, we expect to 
observe more low-equity entry modes when foreign 
firms look for assets that serve primary business 
needs (e.g. low labor costs), and more high-equity 
entry modes when foreign firms look for assets that 
serve more strategic or specific business needs.	  	  
P9: Foreign entrants in search of non-
specific assets will have a preference for a low-
equity entry mode while foreign entrants in search 
of specific assets will opt for a high equity entry 
mode 
VII. Agglomeration	  Effect	  
 
When deciding upon entering a foreign 
market (Hymer, 1960; Caves, 1996), firms take into 
consideration the experience of other firms in their 
immediate business environment (Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf, 1993). The agglomeration effect of 
foreign investment illustrate the need to build active 
local networks, which in turn will attract new 
network partners, either local or foreign (Krugman, 
1991) (Audretsch and Feldman, 1994; Harrison, 
1994) with DIs locating primarily in the vicinity of 
firms in the same industry, or from the same 
country of origin, as evidenced in China (Chen and 
Kwan, 2000). Foreign companies set up operations 
in geographic areas that benefited from earlier 
investments from similar developed countries, 
which leads to the formation of industry clusters. 
Though the core cities of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City 
and Hai Phong accounted for only 13% of the 
population in 1989, they captured about 70% of 
joint-venture investments in all sectors, and their 
neighboring province only 20% (Nguyen and 
Meyer, 1999). Ho Chi Minh, which has 
accommodated foreign companies early on during 
the Doi Moi period, continues to be a magnet for 
foreign investors. Foreign investment are 
principally directed to areas that offer - not the 
cheapest - but the most literate and highly qualified 
labor forces (Nguyen and Meyer, 1999). In contrast 
to other emerging markets where foreign companies 
primarily invest in wealthier areas because of 
improved market prospects, foreign investors in 
Vietnam look primarily for provinces with higher 
quality manpower (i.e., higher level of literacy), 
even if those provinces are economically poorer 
(Nguyen and Meyer, 1999). As long as the 
population flow from the poor rural areas to the 
main cities remains constant, there is little need to 
relocate activities to the low labor-cost periphery. 
Overall, more educated workers and managers, 
easier access to information and market 
opportunities attract firms to the metropolitan areas 
(Tran Thi Bich, 2008). This legitimizes the building 
of industrial parks near the main cities (e.g. the 
Vietnam-Singapore industrial Park which has 124 
tenants, 80 of which are in operations) (Yeoh et al, 
2004). To this add other parks, either Vietnamese, 
such as the Viet Huong Industrial park, Song Than 
1 and 2; Japanese (Thang Long 2 run by 
Sumitomo) or Korean or Taiwanese. Early movers 
have a strong incentive to help latecomers settle in 
these clusters because it increases their business 
network (e.g. in the form of business association) 
and enhances their bargaining power e.g. everyone 
want a stronger Chamber of Commerce to represent 
their interest and create a stronger resource pooling 
and exchange (Wassermanan, 1994) (Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998). Capitalizing on the experience of 
early entrants, late entrants also face less 
uncertainty when making an entry decision. 
Governments, including foreign and state-owned 
firms of the host country will also assist foreign 
investors in building local linkages in an effort to 
promote foreign investment (Yeoh et al, 2004). 
While these local linkages (e.g. to local private 
firms and communities) would traditionally consist 
in joint-ventures to acquire information (Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997), a manager in a foreign market will 
be less willing to opt for a joint venture if it finds 
equally reliable ways to gather information i.e. via 
networks made possible by a greater internet access 
in the developing world; informal contacts with 
business and trade associations, companies from 
similar geographic origins; and knowledge transfers 
from expat returnees or locally-hired expats. These 
networks have grown significantly in recent years, 
and benefits late - rather than early - entrants.  
 
P10 An early - rather than late - entrant 
will prefer a low-equity entry mode (e.g. JV, 
Licensing) when entering a newly-emerging market 
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VIII. Discussion	  
 
After 14 years of socialist experimentation, 
Vietnam entered a new era with the Doi Moi. The 
country drafted its first banking reform and “was 
feted in Paris and Washington for his derring-do” 
(Beech, 2009). While Vietnam had all the 
characteristics of an adversarial market - an 
environment typically characterized by regulatory 
ambiguity, structural uncertainty and a weak legal 
system (Meyer, 1998; Peng, 2000), government 
regulations, institutional and historic ties, helped 
reduce adversity (Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996) and 
created a more stable and liberal environment. To 
this, add a more mature market the dynamic of 
which is better understood and easier-to-obtain 
business licenses. The creation of foreign-
investment zones signaled a warming up of 
relationships, and a return to economic and 
diplomatic normalcy e.g. “the formation of the Tan 
Thuan Export processing zone in 1989 was 
predicated on Vietnam quitting Cambodia, since a 
withdrawal was a precondition for normalizing 
economic relations with Vietnam” (Beech, 2009). 
Unlike other transitional economy (e.g. Russia), 
Vietnam has chosen a gradual path of “system 
improving” rather than a “shock therapy” for its 
transition to a market-based economy (Sachs and 
Woo, 1994): “mass privatization of state-owned 
enterprises does not seem to be necessary to create 
markets in Vietnam” (Lee and al, 2005). Looking at 
joint-venture formation, about 98 percent of joint-
ventures have been made with State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) (Le Dang, 2002). Several 
factors made SOEs attractive partners: 
transportation infrastructure serves state-owned 
firms efficiently  (joint-ventures locate primarily in 
regions with many state-owned firms e.g. Ho-Chi-
Minh) (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), making them 
attractive partners, and though one could have 
expected foreign firms to avoid areas with state-
owned firms or national incumbents for fear of 
reprisals, foreign investors are willing to engage the 
latter as they provide access to government 
institutions (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). For some 
(Nguyen TV et al, 2005), foreign investor can 
benefit from the state owned enterprises’ 
preferential treatment (e.g. the government provides 
SOEs with subsidized bank loans). Foreign firms 
can also obtain financing from international 
financial institutions, as exemplified by Dutch 
Lady, now known as Friesland Campina Vietnam 
Ltd who partly financed its JVs with loans from the 
finance arm of the World Bank i.e. International 
Financial Company (IFC). Ventures with local 
SOEs shall help circumvent domestic private 
sector’s weaknesses and Vietnam’s poor regulatory 
framework e.g. “the transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a socialist-oriented market 
economy implies two kinds of challenges: first, 
totally new fields, never covered, have to be 
regulated; and second, the subjects and institutions 
that have to cope with this work have developed in a 
different context and have no experience with 
aspects of a market economy” (Van Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003) (Leproux, Brooks, 2004). To this, 
adds the discrimination against the private sector in 
terms of imports, technology and training (Thi Bich 
Tran et al, 2007), access to land and capital (i.e. 
contribution of property rights as equity in joint-
ventures with foreign investors is conceded to SOEs 
but not to domestic private enterprises) and 
“equitization”x (i.e. most strategic enterprises have 
remained under government control) (Leproux, 
Brooks, 2004). These constraints have affected 
small and medium Vietnamese enterprises. Instead 
of growing organically, these expand by adding new 
contractors to their existing network (Nguyen et al, 
2005). Politics is a factor (Masina, 2002). The 
emergence of a capitalist private sector may be 
perceived as a challenge to the state’s authority and 
as a factor of political destabilization (Leproux, 
Brooks, 2004). This is not a single authoritative 
view. Others have argued that preservation of the 
state-run economy was to provide a safety net and 
give the private sector enough time to grow (Lee, 
2000). Besides, partnering with state-owned 
companies is the not the panacea e.g. many are 
inefficient and had to be bailed out with government 
money or via bank loans (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 
2003). That preference for SOEs contradicts our 
first proposition (P1 Firms entering a newly-
emerging market will prefer a partnership with a 
private - rather than public - organization). An 
overwhelming majority of local partners of MNEs 
are public sector firms. Vietnamese authorities still 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
x  In Vietnam, the privatization of state owned companies is 
called "equitization". 
 
 
 
 Entry Modes of Europen Firms in Vietnam 
Emerging Markets Journal | P a g e  | 19 
Volume 2 (2012)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/emaj.2012.27   |   http://emaj.pitt.edu 
discriminate against local, private firms which make 
SOEs more attractive for partnering. However, not 
all emerging markets in Indochina have given unfair 
advantages to the public sector: in contrast to 
Vietnam, Laos has aligned its FDI inflow with its 
privatization program; some of its ‘flagship’ state-
owned enterprises (e.g. the country’s 
telecommunications company, the Beer Lao 
brewery) were partially sold to foreign investors 
(Freeman, 2002b). 
 
In our cases, foreign firms relied on 
opposite entry modes, with a preference for either a 
high-equity entry mode such as wholly-owned 
subsidiary, or a simple licensing agreement. 
Haymarket Media, one of the largest UK publishers 
in the UK, has launched its journals into Vietnam 
via a licensing system. In line with its transnational 
strategy, the parent company provides generic 
content (i.e. one that remains similar across its 
overseas editions) to its affiliated partners. The 
latter only adds local content. Haymarket Media 
intended strategy was twofold. Firstly, capitalizing 
on a 5 year old relationship, it intended to add new 
magazines to its partner’s portfolio. Secondly, it 
looked for additional distributors to expand its 
readership. However, the company has an explicit 
‘licensing and syndication’ strategy for its 
international magazines and content (over 40 
editions of Haymarket’s magazines published in 
Asia and a growing portfolio of online versions in 
Asia for a long timexi) which are managed from its 
Hong Kong offices. There has never been any 
strategy to set up WOFS in Asia. Licensing is more 
appropriate than a subsidiary because asset 
specificity is low. The most specific asset (i.e. the 
journal content) already exists and is owned by the 
foreign firm. Rather than creating new specific (i.e. 
localized) asset (i.e. content), the firm make existing 
asset ‘sweat’ i.e. generate more cash by selling the 
same content to new overseas markets. These 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
xi In China, simplified Chinese; Hong Kong, traditional Chinese; 
India – Gujarati; Indonesia – Bahasa Indonesian; Japan – 
Japanese; Korea, South – Korean; Malaysia – English; 
Philippines – English; Singapore – English; Taiwan – 
Traditional Chinese; Thailand – Thai; Vietnam – 
Vietnamese. 
licenses are not strategic, but confined to one stage 
of the value chain (i.e. marketing and sales). The 
only intangible specific asset consists of 
connections with publishers and advertisers. 
 
 The same can be observed in the yachting 
industry (e.g. Fairchild’ licensing agreement aimed 
at obtaining an access to potential yacht buyers and 
politicians to build marinas in touristy areas) and in 
education with Creative Education: foreign entrants 
rely on low-equity entry modes when looking for 
assets with low specificity (e.g. buildings or 
classrooms). Though these firms were first 
entrantsxii, they did opt for a low-equity entry mode, 
which supports our proposition (P10 an early - 
rather than late - entrant will prefer a low-equity 
entry mode when entering a newly-emerging 
market). The same applied to Cadbury. Though an 
early entrant in the emerging Vietnamese 
confectionary sector, it shunned the creation of a 
joint-venture, preferring a simple distribution 
agreement. Only when foreign firms seek more 
specific assets, do they look for a more complex 
form of cooperation (e.g. a joint-venture, a wholly-
owned subsidiary), which support our earlier 
proposition (P9: “foreign entrants in search of non-
specific assets will prefer a low-equity entry mode 
while foreign entrants in search of specific assets 
will opt for a high equity entry mode”). For 
instance, Sanofi created the Sanofi-Pharma Vietnam 
joint venture in 1992 with Usine 23, one of the 
major national pharmaceutical companies. Aventis 
Pharma International established the Roussel 
Vietnam Joint Venture in 1993 as a 40/60 joint-
venture with Sapharco. Both were looking for 
specific resources (e.g. medicinal plants to be used 
in R&D), which justified a higher equity stake. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
xii  In particular, Fairchild was a first entrant in the nascent 
yachting market: unlike Taiwan, Vietnam has no yachting 
industry and lacks basic infrastructure (e.g. marinas, 
engineers, skippers, after-sales maintenance). 
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IX. Cultural	  differences,	  opportunism	  and	  subsidiary	  creation	  
 
In Vietnam, joint-ventures proved 
disappointing. In the earlier year of the Doi Moi 
period, foreign investors sought partnership with 
local Vietnamese firms, and joint ventures were to 
overcome inefficient bureaucracy, acquire market 
and business information (Griffith, Zeybek, and 
O'Brien 2001) (Erramilli and Rao, 1993), and lower 
foreign entrant’ sunk costs (Root, 1987). However, 
joint-ventures lacked flexibility and many ended up 
in disputes because the minority partner could and 
did exercise significant power on his foreign partner 
e.g. Sapharco purchased the stake held by French 
partner to turn Roussel Vietnam into a 100% 
locally-owned company in 2002. To this, add the 
meddling of ministries and provincial authorities if 
the local partner is a state-owned enterprise, and the 
fear that a partner may eventually become a 
competitor. A compounding factor were differences 
in law: ownership status will determine which law 
to apply because different laws regulate the private 
and state sectors (CIE, 1998), (Nguyen TV et al, 
2005) e.g. in a survey of tenant firms of a 
Vietnamese industrial park, the smaller ventures 
cited government interference as the major 
constraint they encountered (in contrast the larger 
wholly-owned companies cited competition for 
overseas competitors) (Yeoh et al, 2004). In such a 
high-risk environment, firms are less likely to 
cooperate (Carlier and Tran, 2005). As Thi et al 
(2008) observed, while 30 percent of firms in the 
1996 sample relied on a network of subcontractors, 
that percentage decreased to 18 percent in 2001. 
This supports proposition 6 (e.g. a subsidiary will 
be preferred when the target market is unfamiliar 
and trust lacking). Conversely, when trust abounds, 
contracts are not a priority. Because of the trust it 
had in its partners, Creative Education thought that 
contract would be of limited value in the 
Vietnamese context, thus it neither created a 
subsidiary, not opted for a joint-venture. When trust 
exists, contracts are believed to be superfluous. 
 
Being patient and blending into the local 
culture is critical to success. The risk however is to 
try too hard to play with the local rules; that is to 
leave one’s own comfort zone, “change the way one 
would normally operate, and eventually do business 
in a way that would be considered irrational at 
home” (Creative education). In retrospect, 
inefficient partners and cultural misunderstanding in 
Vietnam suggest that foreign firms would be better 
off by choosing a wholly-owned subsidiary, as these 
have lower failure rates. From 1988 till November 
1997, the failure rate of investment projects in all 
sectors was 16% in Vietnam (694 investment 
projects were dissolved out of 4,514 projects)xiii. 
The failure rate of joint ventures is thought to be at 
least twice as much (Thu, 1998). The number of 
equity-based relationships (e.g., joint ventures) and 
other business relations between foreign investors 
and private sector companies has been fairly 
disappointing (Freeman, 2002a): 60% of the 
registered FDI was not used in 2006xiv. The slow 
FDI implementation has been attributed to factors 
such as inadequate infrastructure, management 
problems and a shortage of adequately trained 
human resourcexv. With feedback and experience 
from previous entrants, late entrants prefer 
subsidiaries over joint-ventures and other low-
equity entry modes. The former represents a higher 
fraction of foreign investment in Vietnam, with 
61% of licensed projects compared to 34.3% of 
licensed projects for joint ventures (Le Dang, 2002). 
The same can be observed in China. Joint-ventures 
are no longer the preferred entry mode. In 2004, 
wholly-owned subsidiaries accounted for 65% of 
entry modes in 2004 (24 % for the period 1979-
1996) compared to 30 % for equity joint venture (61 
% for the period 1979-1996), and 5 % for 
cooperative venture (15 % for the period 1979-
1996). This supports proposition 10 (P10 Early 
entrants will opt for a low-equity entry mode while 
late entrant will opt for a high-equity entry mode 
when entering a newly-emerging market), but 
contradicts proposition P2 (As the socio-political 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
xiii  e.g. there has been a high number of high-profile withdrawal 
cases such as Chrysler’s abandonment of a car plant, or the 
withdrawal of Total from a refinery project 
xiv  http://www.economywatch.com/foreign-direct-
investment/countries/vietnam.html 
xv  http://www.economywatch.com/foreign-direct-
investment/countries/vietnam.html 
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environment stabilizes, foreign firms prefer 
subsidiaries over joint ventures). The preference for 
subsidiaries can be explained by the lack of trust in 
partners and institutions, not by improvement in the 
socio-political environment. In the education 
venture for instance, even if there was a genuine 
commitment (the local partner made significant 
investments e.g. in the form of a new building, by 
providing an operating license while the foreign 
partner provided Hanoi-based foreign staff, 
curriculum, teacher training, recruitment and 
management services and proprietary knowledge 
e.g. course syllabus), the local firm omitted 
significant financial information in its dealings with 
the British education provider. Major cultural 
differences also emerged during the negotiations 
process: under the belief that personal relationships 
were more important, that a contract has little legal 
value (though their symbolic value cannot be 
dismissed), the British education provider engaged 
in lengthy negotiations before withdrawing from the 
venture after months of negotiation. A subsidiary 
would have eliminated those risks, as exemplified 
by the many other education service providers that 
have since set up WOFSs in Vietnam. For instance, 
British International School caters to expatriates’ 
children and local children from wealthy families. 
ILA Vietnam is a 100% foreign-owned education 
and training company that provides English 
language programmes. To this add university 
pathway programmes, corporate training and 
teacher training. RMIT International University has 
remained the only foreign university to operate 
soloxvi.  
 
Only when investment are stake are large, 
do foreign firm seek a partner: wholly-owned 
foreign enterprises accounted for 32.8% of FDI 
value in 2002, and joint-ventures for 53% of FDI 
value. Foreign firm would go alone, if it were not 
for the size of the investment. Besides, the reason 
for opting for a subsidiary might also not fall under 
the Uppsala school’s of “psychic distance” (e.g. 
lack of trust in partners and institutions, 
opportunistic behaviors, and cultural differences, 
etc): large number of MNEs set up 100% wholly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
xvi It has a student body of approximately 5,000 
owned foreign subsidiary (WOFS) from scratch e.g. 
Nestle (food), Prudential (life insurance and 
financial services), etc. (just to name a few 
European companies as this paper focuses on 
European companies) because they possess strong 
firm-specific-advantages (capital, brand, marketing, 
management, international experience in new 
venture start up, and ability to hire good 
experienced local personnel, etc.) that no local firm 
can match, which supports P8 (Capacity matching 
concerns - rather than cultural distance - will 
prompt a foreign firm to opt for a high equity entry 
mode in a newly-emerging market). 
X. The	  time	  horizon	  issue	  
 
In contrast to proposition 3 “As the time 
horizon of foreign investment expands, foreign 
firms prefer a wholly-owned subsidiary over a low-
equity entry mode (e.g. alliance, joint venture, 
partnership)”, a long-term view does not prompt 
foreign investors to opt for a subsidiary. In our 
cases, no firm opted for a subsidiary because of 
investment delay, and many maintained they 
strategy of licensing because of the lack of efficient 
patent protection in Vietnam: though licensing out 
is a low-risk/return alternative that provides little 
control, it enables the licensing firm to make a rapid 
entry and obtain some, but not all return on 
investment when facing potential future copycats 
(Rajshekhar and Wright, 2003).  
 
In contrast to earlier research studies 
(Davidson, 1980; Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992) 
that states that newly-emerging markets are more 
likely to attract experienced - rather than 
inexperienced - firms, and that firms with 
international experience have a preference for high 
equity entry modes (e.g. wholly-owned entry 
modes), firms in our group cases did not opt for a 
subsidiary in Vietnam: in 2006, Cadbury 
Schweppes signed a distribution agreement with 
Vietnam's leading food maker Kinh Do, one of the 
largest confectionary companies in Vietnam, giving 
it access to its distribution network. Despite a long-
term business strategy, a double-digit market 
growth in Vietnam and a strong international 
experience, Cadbury commitment did not extend as 
far as far as opening a subsidiary from scratch. Only 
in more mature - but still emerging - market was an 
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acquisition a better option for the British company. 
In Brazil, Cadbury acquired Adams, a giant 
confection company with distribution channel and a 
decent share of the market. Perhaps, this was the 
only option at the time. In 2006, when it entered 
into the distribution agreement with Kinh Do, the 
parent firm itself was confronted with a take-over 
bid from Kraft Food, which left the company with 
few resources, and opening a subsidiary in Vietnam 
was not an option at this time. It is the more 
inexperienced and smaller entrants (e.g. foreign 
entrepreneurs) who opted for a wholly-owned 
subsidiary in Vietnam, as exemplified by the 
privately-owned firm Artemisinin and Farming 
International (AFI) in the anti-malarial industry. 
This is in line with concurrent observations in the 
Cambodian and Laotian hospitality sector (Hipsher 
2008), and earlier observations in Honduras (Befus, 
1988): foreign entrepreneurs often launch their own 
small firm in a foreign country (“foreign-born 
firm”). As Hipsher (2008) notes, the lack of 
government regulations, the lower sunk costs, the 
less intense competition and the informal nature of 
the economy encourage entrepreneurs to start a 
subsidiary from scratch. Traditional barriers to 
entrepreneurship in mature markets (e.g. access to 
capital, business experience, and competition on 
market) are not as high in less developed foreign 
markets. Most often, subsidiary creation is based on 
personal factors: a short term exposure to the 
country (as an expat working in the country or 
during travel / leisure time), an entrepreneurial 
mindset, the “need to do something” in an 
environment that provide little employment 
opportunities and where self-employment is seen as 
a poverty-reduction strategy. However, full 
ownership could not prevent opportunism. AFI had 
to relocate its activities (e.g. farming, post-
harvesting, and extraction) from the Red River 
Basin of Northern Vietnam to northern Thailand 
due to difficulties in controlling costs. 
Compounding factors were ineffective middle-men, 
unsecured transaction prices, problems in accessing 
land and obtaining local funding of working capital. 
Thus, neither proposition 7 (A large and 
experienced entrant will prefer a wholly-owned 
subsidiary (i.e. internalization) over a low-equity 
entry mode when entering a newly-emerging 
market), nor proposition 5 (“In adversarial markets, 
effectiveness i.e. ability to achieve a desired goal 
and a higher opportunism risk leads foreign 
investors to prefer a subsidiary over a joint-
venture”) are supported.  
 
Country - rather than international - 
experience is a factor when switching to a high-
equity entry mode. Converting a joint venture into a 
wholly-owned subsidiary is more straightforward 
for country-experienced firms: Aventis and Sanofi-
Synthelabo set up two joint-ventures Aventis 
Vietnam, formerly known as Vinaspecia, and 
Sanofi-Pharma Vietnam in 1992. As Sanofi’s 
market experience grew, the firm raised its initial 
50% stake in the company to 70% in June 1995. As 
for Aventis, it ended its joint-venture with its 
Vietnamese partner i.e. Sapharco to set up a wholly 
foreign-owned company in Vietnam in 2002. 
Acquisition of local knowledge was a factor in 
increasing the drug firm financial stake (Puck et al., 
2006). As for Aventis, the conversion to a 
subsidiary will put an end to the discrepancy in 
resources brought by partners, which supports 
proposition 8 “Capacity matching concerns - rather 
than cultural distance - will prompt a foreign firm to 
opt for a high equity entry mode in a newly-
emerging market”. It also appears than when 
transactions imply highly specific assets, as in the 
pharmaceutical industry, firms will opt for high-
control modes (e.g. subsidiaries) regardless of 
environmental uncertainty. In 2000, on 24 foreign 
projects invested in the Vietnamese pharmaceutical 
industry, there were 15 enterprises with 100% 
foreign investment capital and 8 joint ventures only 
(Invest Consult Group, 2002). Wholly owned 
subsidiary have become more prevalent because of 
the potential of the Vietnamese market due to its 
sheer size (87 million people), central location 
(Vietnam is increasingly used a base for exporting 
drug product to neighboring countries of Laos and 
Cambodia) (Simonet, 2008) and rapid growth 
(health expenditure has been growing at more than 
10% annually and the drug market at 4.5% per 
annum) (WPM Outlook, 2005). That is in line with 
earlier work: Makino and Neupert (2000) found that 
strong market growth prompts managers to prefer 
wholly owned subsidiaries over joint ventures.  
 
Conclusion: We note the high number of 
simple agreements (e.g. licensing) in our cases. 
After more than 20 years of economic and 
diplomatic opening, one would have expected that 
trust would flourish, and that foreign entrants would 
display a greater level of commitment and a 
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preference for high equity entry modes. However, 
in a country that is gradually liberalizing but is still 
heavily government regulated, one that is growing 
fast but is as yet a developing country with 
uncertainty about the economic conditions, 
licensing agreements still prevail, even among large 
and experienced firms: Joint venture had outcomes 
below expectations, and subsidiary creation is no 
guarantee for success. The preference for low equity 
entry mode (e.g. licensing) signals foreign firms’ 
reluctance to commit to the Vietnamese market, 
despite its potential (in terms of customer base, 
growth rate). In Vietnam, the life cycle of the 
Uppsala model has a longer life span than 
anticipated, with foreign firms’ exploratory phase 
lasting more than 20 years. In contrast to European 
firms that have entered eastern European markets 
with full-fledged subsidiaries, managers go through 
extensive testing in Vietnam, relying on low-
commitment entry modes to gain a foothold in the 
market, even after its 20-years transition to 
capitalism, perhaps because of the nature of 
Vietnamese capitalism: it is a state - rather than 
private - capitalism. It remains to be seen whether 
the preference for entry modes with low-sunk costs 
will constitute a hurdle in the development of the 
Vietnamese economy, or if it will protect it from 
foreign competitors until a strong domestic private 
sector emerges. 
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